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BOOK REVIEWS
CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SUPREME COURT. By Wal-
lace Mendelson. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc. 1960. Pp. 128 plus index. $1.25.
Harold Lasswell tells us that politics is a question of who
gets what, when, and how, and that the elite are those who
get the most of what there is to get. According to Karl Marx,
what there is to get is primarily economic wealth and the
power that accompanies it. In a capitalistic society, Marx
argued, social, moral, and political institutions are the means
by which capitalists enrich themselves. And courts of law
are not excepted from this generalization. From such a per-
spective freedom and democracy may be promoted by those
who pursue wealth and power as long as such an emphasis
serves narrow self-interest. In this vein, Charles Beard has
pointed to the economic motivations of those who framed the
Federal Constitution; and C. Wright Mills has posited a con-
spiratorial elite composed of economic, political, and military
leaders who manipulate the trappings of American democracy
for their own ends.
In the same tradition, Wallace Mendelson outlines what
might be called the "incidental theory of democracy." The
thrust for freedom from church, feudal, and royal interfer-
ence by the entrepreneur of an earlier era is seen as incidental
to profit-making. The business class "philosophized in uni-
versal terms; but time revealed that the freedoms it sought
were fashioned for its own peculiar business needs." (Page 3.)
Since the lower classes failed to note the subtle distinction,
the possessors of wealth found themselves pressed from below
by those proclaiming the very same values on a universal
scale: the difference was that the "scum" meant it. Thus, the
American Revolution was "also a struggle for power between
the merchant-planter oligarchy of the seacoast and the radical-
democratic western frontiersmen." (Page 4.)
Although the interest of the northern merchant lay in ac-
commodation with the British Empire, having lost its legalistic
argument, the merchant class resorted to the lower classes for
support and as a result lost control of the Revolution. Some
ground was regained in the framing of the Constitution, but
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interpretive struggles between the Hamiltonians and the Jef-
fersonians have continued to this day.
The role played by the United States Supreme Court in
this conflict is sketched through a series of essays built around
Chief Justices Marshall and Taney and Associate Justices
Field, Holmes, Black, and Frankfurter. The Court's role, as
Mendelson sees it, has not been to referee the conflict in any
objective sense. Rather, the Court has behaved consistently
with Mendelson's own conception of the "function of law and
its minions," i.e., "to vindicate dominant social ideas, inter-
ests, and institutions." (Page 35.) While Marx might say that
the dominant interests are always capitalistic, Mendelson
suggests that "dominance" has oscillated between Hamiltonian
and Jeffersonian interests.
Each school of thought has had its supporters on the Su-
preme Court at crucial times. John Marshall is viewed as-
a Hamiltonian mercantilist, opposed to states' rights localism,
whose opinions "subsumed the claims of democracy to vested
business interests." (Page 27.) Jacksonian democracy was
anti-mercantilist and stood for a genuine laissez faire and
states' rights (but not for state sovereignty). Its chief spokes-
man on -the Court - Roger Taney - contributed the concept
of judicial self-restraint, emphasized so frequently in the
present day by Justice Frankfurter. The period of Mr. Justice
Field saw the establishment of the gospel of wealth in the
Court's opinions. As Holmes was later to note, Herbert Spen-
cer's social statics were written into the Constitution in this
era. As a judge, Holmes brought humility and skepticism to
the Court. Mendelson sees Holmes' genius as lying in his
"refusal to read his own experiences and beliefs into the Con-
stitution, and his alertness in opposing judicial associates
who, often unconsciously, did so." (Page 75.)
That laissez faire is not a mandate of the Constitution even-
tually prevailed. And in the "new Court" there is complete
unanimity on the point - but only in reference to economic
policy. In the area of civil rights, both state and federal
measures continue to be vetoed ostensibly to safeguard civil
liberty. The Court is presently split on the role it should play
in this respect as is also true on questions of federalism.
Mendelson identifies Justices Black and Frankfurter as rep-
resenting the opposing schools of thought on these questions.
These two Justices and their supporters differ fundamentally
on the issue: "[T]o what extent should such matters be left
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for solution by the political processes themselves?" (Page
98.)
It seems clear, then, that Mendelson does not see the present
era as one in which economic interests are controlling the
Court for selfish advantage and to the detriment of democ-
racy. But he is concerned about the activist philosophy that
Black is said to represent. Since Black acts on this philosophy
primarily in the area of civil liberty, one may wonder how and
why this constitutes a threat to freedom or democracy. The
answer, for Mendelson, seems to be that the Court should
not "wet nurse" democracy, but should hold back and "permit
the American dream to develop its own democratic devices of
responsibility and self-confidence." (Page 128.) Justice
Black subscribes, it has been charged, to the notion that
unfortunate litigants occupy a preferred position when in
conflict with government, whether state or federal. Black
is quite willing to upset state or federal legislative and ad-
ministrative actions in such cases. Frankfurter is said to
have a more reasonable approach - an approach involving
less rigidity, and a greater appreciation for the policy choices
made by the political branches of government.
One way to evaluate this philosophical difference is to con-
sider its consequences for judicial decision making. If Black
and Frankfurter -are taken as representing the two polar
positions, a perusal of their voting patterns in certain areas
is suggestive. For example, we may ask what differences
would occur between voting patterns of the activist and the
nonactivist judge in civil liberty cases. This reviewer has,
in his own work, compiled voting statistics in all cases in-
volving aliens, alleged communist or communist sympathizers,
and Negroes for the period 1955-1960. The varying rate at
which the Justices have supported these litigant types are
sufficient to raise some eyebrows. Support for aliens, for
example, has ranged from 11 to 97 per cent; for communists
the support rate is 25 to 100 per cent; in Negro cases support
for the Negro claimant has varied from 40 to 89 per cent.
While such data does not prove that any particular Justice
is pro-communist, pro-alien, or pro-Negro, it does suggest that
certain Justices may be emotionally involved with the status
of the litigant. If we compare Black and Frankfurter we find
that Black supported the alien claim in 36 of 38 cases (97
per cent) ; the communist claim in 47 of 47 cases (100 per
1961]
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cent); and the Negro claim in 24 of 28 cases (87 per cent).
Frankfurter, on the other hand, split 19-19 (50 per cent) in
the alien cases; he supported communist claims in 34 of 47
cases (72 per cent); and in Negro cases he voted for the
claimant 19 times out of 28 possible opportunities (67 per
cent). The Frankfurter pattern is consonant with his greater
reluctance to interfere with government (state or federal),
while the Black pattern suggests he may be straining to strike
governmental action and needs little provocation to do so. If
Black is right, the figures suggest that the Supreme Court
is getting a large number of cases that should have been set-
tled at a lower level, for the pressures of time dictate that
the Supreme Court be reserved for marginal cases in which
outcome for or against the litigant is doubtful.
If Mendelson's view of the function and role of the Supreme
Court is correct, one may or may not be concerned with the
particular results of judicial activism. For if the Court is
deciding cases in terms of dominant social, political, and
economic interests, the question becomes essentially whether
one welcomes such a situation. From this perspective, if
Black is out of tune with the dominant values of society, his
philosophy would be of little importance. If otherwise, then
the objection must lie not against Black but against prevail-
ing mores which happen to be dominant at a point in time.
In short, one cannot subscribe to determinism and individual
responsibility at the same time without, at least, offering some
reconciliation of what seems to be incompatible positions. Pre-
sumably, Mendelson would have something to say about the
values reflected in Supreme Court decisions if these values
deviated sufficiently from those he holds dear. His essays
leave such questions unanswered. It is not clear whether he
feels that the Court should represent the views of a majority,
a dominant minority, or neither. It is clear, however, that
in his opinion the policy-making role of the Court should be
somewhat reduced. The contemporary South is not likely to
consider such a conclusion distasteful or unwise.
S. SIDNEY ULMER.*
*A.B., Furman University, M.A. and Ph.D., Duke University. Assistant
Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University."
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THE VOICE OF MODERN TRIALS. By Melvin M. Belli. Vol.
III- Illustrations of Cross Examination Techniques
by John Alan Appleman. San Francisco: The Belli Foun-
dation, 1961; three long-playing records.
This sound recording can be valuable to the trial lawyer
or the law student. With introduction and comment by Mr.
Belli, and the actual examples of cross-examination by Mr.
Appleman, these three long-playing records require the un-
divided attention of the listener for the better part of an
afternoon. The abilities of these men have been combined
to show vividly the necessity for knowing the principles in
the separate art of cross-examination.
Mr. Belli and Mr. Appleman adhere today to the well known
admonition that one may not stumble or wander in this field,
and it is more often true than not that no cross-examination
is better than an unprepared one. In line with this cautious
approach to cross-examination, the rules are negatively
stated: Don't force an examination, don't reiterate the facts
of the other side, be certain of the witness's answer, never
ask "why" or "how," don't let the witness guess your ob-
jective, don't move in for the kill. Several positive rules are
set forth by Mr. Appleman: Find the vulnerability of the
witness beforehand, if possible; prepare questions ahead to
be asked in an order carrying conviction.
Extensive examples are given on cross-examination of ex-
perts, with guiding principles applying mainly to these types
of witnesses. Meeting an expert on his own ground is most
difficult and should not be attempted unless preceded by
intensive study. With many experts some success may be
had by seeking to flatter the witness and by eliciting from
him as many "yes" answers as possible. With some experts
it is possible to encourage obvious exaggeration.
How and when to begin and to end is a most important
feature in Mr. Appleman's lessons. He points out that many
lawyers are too prone and too intent upon eliciting an ad-
mission without the proper foundation. The result is that
many lawyers tend to move in for that last, best question
without preliminary facts being established. This record
shows with skill how one should have the witness irretriev-
ably committed to certain facts, from which he cannot with-
draw, before the final question is asked.
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The listener should observe caution when Mr. Appleman
asks questions of a witness but does not divulge how he knew
what the answers were to be, thus apparently violating his
own rule. Here it should be borne in mind that the answers
given by the witness are designed to make the question a
successful one in order that his point may be clear. Mr.
Appleman must, of necessity, adopt a short, direct type of
questioning for the purpose of the lesson he is giving and the
listener should not assume the witness's responses to these
demonstrations as those which an average person would norm-
ally give. The demontration, it is believed, could have been
improved by illustrating faulty questions with an accompany-
ing victory by the witness. It is believed that this would
have more vividly illustrated the valuable rules set forth at
the outset. On the whole the recordings stand unimpaired
and can be useful.
ALVA M. LUMPKIN.*
*Roberts, Jennings, Thomas & Lumpkin, Columbia, S. C.
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